Subject: Civil War and Genocide in Darfur: Chinese and Saharan
Dimensions
Civil War and Genocide in Darfur: Chinese and Saharan Dimensions
James Swan, Deputy Assistant Secretary
Hosted at The American Enterprise Institute
Washington, DC
May 3, 2007
Good afternoon, and thank you for the kind introduction. I appreciate
being
here at the American Enterprise Institute and having the opportunity to
address
the regional dimensions of the Darfur conflict.
American news coverage typically zeros in on Darfur specifically, but to
truly
understand the conflict and its larger implications, it is important to
look
beyond western Sudan. One must also consider internal dynamics in
neighboring
nations Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) and examine each
country's
relationships with one another.
The U.S. approach to the conflict in Darfur fully recognizes its
regional
dimensions. We consult frequently with other governments in the region,
including those of Chad, CAR, and Libya. On his first visit to Africa in
his
new capacity, Deputy Secretary of State John Negroponte visited Sudan,
Chad,
and Libya earlier this month.
Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios has also consulted with Chadians
and
Libyans on the way forward in Darfur and participated just last week in
a
meeting on Darfur convened in Tripoli. I personally visited Chad and CAR
earlier this month. In short, we fully understand that the regional
neighbors
have a key role to play in a solution to Darfur.
HISTORICAL CONTEXT
Chad and CAR have a long history of instability and war that can be
attributed
to a combination of domestic and regional factors. Neither country has a
record
of good governance, rule of law, or democracy. This leaves both
countries
vulnerable to external interference and limits options for peaceful
resolution
of internal problems.
Since achieving independence in 1960, both Chad and CAR have been
subject to
several power struggles and periods of civil conflict. Chad experienced
an
almost continuous civil war from 1965 to 1993, when current President
Deby
initiated a national reconciliation process.
Chad and Sudan have a complex relationship in which national borders are
subordinate to tribal loyalty or the fight for natural resources. In
eastern
Chad and in western Sudan, for example, limited access to water and
arable land
leads to conflicts between pastoralists and agriculturalists on both
sides of
the border. Familial and ethnic ties also exacerbate economic tensions.
Chadian rebels have long used Sudan as a base for attacks into Chad,
sometimes
with Sudanese government complicity. Both Chadian President Deby and his
predecessor Hissene Habre assumed power through military campaigns based
in
Sudan, thus establishing enduring connections with Sudanese actors.
The current Chadian rebel movements, which gained strength in late 2005
and
2006 due to defections of high-ranking civil and military officers,
including
members of Deby's tribe, also enjoy Sudanese government support.
CAR's president, Francois Bozize, came to power by overthrowing former
President Patasse in a coup in 2003 with Chadian support. He
subsequently won
the 2005 presidential election, which international observers deemed
acceptable, so as not to contradict the will of the Central African
people.
Bozize, who resided in Chad while in exile, has strong personal ties to
Chadian
President Deby.
Rebels supporting Patasse stepped up operations in the north and
northwest
parts of the country during 2005. Groups with alleged links to Sudan
took over
four northeastern towns in October and November 2006. After being
defeated by
government forces with French support, the rebels attacked again in
early March
2007, but they were quickly defeated.
Three of the country's rebel groups, including the main northeastern
group, the
Union of Democratic Forces for Unity, which is commonly known by its
French
acronym, UFDR, have now signed a peace agreement with CAR's government
and
pledged to stop all attacks.
REGIONAL ASPECTS OF CRISIS
Support for rebel groups across the border flows in both directions -
back and
forth between Chad and Sudan. Tribal loyalty appears to be at the heart
of
Chadian support for Sudanese rebel groups, including those that have not
signed
the Darfur Peace Agreement.
President Deby and many members of the Chadian elite belong to the
Zaghawa
tribe, which dominates some Darfur rebel groups, including the Justice
and
Equality Movement, or JEM. There are reports that JEM fighters have
engaged
Chadian rebels alongside the Chadian military (ANT).
An example of internal Chadian politics affecting Darfur -- President
Deby
originally prohibited his supporters from backing Darfur rebel groups,
but he
has been weakened politically by defections and can no longer afford to
restrict Darfur rebel support and risk alienating his remaining
supporters.
While the population in northwestern CAR, including the rebels, does not
appear
to have direct ties to Sudan, the population in northeastern CAR has
ethnic and
familial links to the Sudanese population residing across the border.
CAR rebels appear to be linked to their Chadian counterparts. It is
unclear
whether the Sudanese government is supplying any support to the rebels
in
northeastern CAR; however, there are reports that Chadian rebels have,
and
could in the future, traverse northern CAR to attack N'djamena from
bases in
Sudan.
Most of CAR's territory is ungoverned space, which makes it both
extremely
unstable and incredibly attractive to rebel groups looking for either
refuge or
unobserved transit points.
As in Sudan, communal tensions have grown in Chad in recent years due to
conflict over land and natural resources, particularly water, in an area
of
environmental extremes. This rise in communal tensions, coupled with a
security
vacuum -- due to the Chadian military's engagement with the rebels - has
led to
ethnic-based militias, similar to the Sudanese Janjaweed, engaging in
violence
to settle scores, loot villages, and raid cattle and livestock.
In response, other ethnic groups have formed self-defense militias with
the
assistance of the Chadian military. Finally, there are also reports that
Sudanese Janjaweed have crossed into Chad to attack Chadian Africans.
While
these Janjaweed are partially responsible for some of the recent
attacks, most
have been conducted by Chadian Arabs. There are few reports of
inter-ethnic
violence in CAR.
THE HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGE
This violence has negatively impacted civilians, who are subject to
attack by
rebel groups, government forces, and ethnic militias. The United Nations
(UN)
estimates that there are 230,000 Sudanese refugees and up to 140,000
internally
displaced persons (IDPs) in eastern Chad, many of whom have suffered
secondary
displacement and whose numbers have doubled in the last five months.
The UN also estimates that 290,000 Central Africans are displaced, of
whom
212,000 are IDPs, 50,000 are refugees in southern Chad, 25,000 are
refugees in
Cameroon, and 3,000 are refugees, who have fled to Sudan.
Attacks against international workers and facilities in Chad led to UN
and
international non-governmental organization (NGO) staffing reductions of
about
50 percent. At present staffing levels, the humanitarian community in
Chad
simply cannot accommodate new IDP populations or new refugee inflows
from
Darfur.
THE USG RESPONSE
The United States has taken a holistic approach to addressing stability
and
security in Chad and CAR, an approach that accounts for regional
dynamics, as
well as domestic political and economic realities. I visited Chad and
CAR in
early April to address our various concerns, and Deputy Secretary
Negroponte
visited Sudan, Chad, and Libya in April expressly to address regional
dimensions of the conflict.
Our policy in Darfur has three prongs: humanitarian response, peaceful
resolution of the conflict, and the implementation of a robust
peacekeeping
force. The U.S. continues to be the single largest donor of humanitarian
assistance in Sudan, but our relief efforts have been hampered by
insecurity in
the region. We have called on all actors in Darfur - the government, the
Arab
militias, the rebel signatories and the non-signatories to cease all
interference with aid delivery.
The Darfur Peace Agreement, or DPA, is the second prong. We continue to
call on
the government to implement key portions of the agreement now. We also
have
called on the non-signatories to join the agreement.
Lastly, there is peacekeeping. In an April 18th speech at the United
States
Holocaust Memorial Museum, President Bush laid out a series of steps,
including
sanctions, the United States is prepared to take if President Bashir
does not
allow for the immediate deployment of UN/AU peacekeepers, end his
support for
the Janjaweed militias, and permit unimpeded humanitarian aid to enter
Darfur.
As in Darfur, our policy in Chad and CAR is focused on the three prongs
of:
humanitarian assistance, security, and peaceful resolution of internal
conflicts. The United States is the largest bilateral provider of
humanitarian
assistance in both Chad and CAR, focusing on both refugees and
internally
displaced persons.
We have publicly and privately supported a robust United Nations
peacekeeping
operation in Chad and CAR that would focus on both protecting civilians
and
deterring cross-border attacks. While the mission would not have an
express
mandate to secure the Chad-Sudan and CAR-Sudan borders, we believe that
its
mere presence and execution of its civilian protection and monitoring
mission
would lead to a noticeable reduction in violence. In his recent meetings
with
Chadian President Deby in N'djamena, Deputy Secretary Negroponte
underscored
the importance of such a mission.
We are committed to generating the most robust force possible for the
operation, and we have already approached several governments with
requests for
troop contributions.
We are also working to address domestic factors contributing to the
instability
in both Chad and CAR. We recognize that poor governance is the root of
Chad's
instability, and in our communications with Chadian officials, we have
emphasized the importance of: democratic reform, dialogue, and
transparent
governance.
In Chad, this message has been delivered consistently at every level,
from
Secretary Rice to President Deby and via our working-level contacts. We
have
coordinated with our European Union, French, and UN colleagues on
programs
intended to reform the electoral process.
The U.S. has repeatedly condemned efforts by Chadian rebels to take
power by
force, and we have repeatedly urged the Chadian government to block
support for
Sudanese rebel groups that have not signed onto the Darfur Peace
Agreement.
As in Chad, we engage regularly with CAR government officials about the
need
for democratic reform and good governance. I personally delivered this
message
to President Bozize during a visit to Bangui at the end of March.
The United States has also supported extending the mandates of the UN
Peace-building Office inside the Central African Republic, known as
BONUCA, and
the Multinational Force of the Central African Monetary and Economic
Community,
or FOMUC, in order to promote stability in CAR. FOMUC troops have
actively
engaged rebel groups in their pursuit of peace in CAR, and we are
optimistic
that the combined impact of these efforts will yield positive results in
the
years ahead.
INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS
We have seen efforts by several international actors to foster peace and
security in the region. We welcome these efforts, but urge that all
diplomatic
activities should be coordinated with the AU and UN, who have taken the
lead.
The need for coordination with the AU and UN was underscored at the
April 28-29
conference on the political process for Darfur in Tripoli, at which the
U.S.
was represented by Special Envoy for Sudan Andrew Natsios. The Saudi
king
mediated a meeting between Bashir and Deby today.
We also understand that there was a meeting today between the Sudanese
and
Chadian military chiefs and mediated by the Libyans and Eritreans, to
discuss
how to defuse tension and deploy forces on the Chad-Sudan border. Though
we do
not have full details of the results, this appears to be a positive
step.
However, we remain convinced that the only way to effectively protect
the camps
and to stem further destabilization in the absence of fully-implemented
and
inclusive peace agreements on both sides of the border is to deploy two
separate peacekeeping operations to the region, one in Chad and CAR and
the
other in Darfur.
Any policy in the region needs to consider seriously the role of Libya.
Libya,
which has its own complex relationship with both Chad and Sudan, appears
to be
committed to promoting stability and has sponsored numerous summits
intended to
compel Chad and Sudan to publicly reaffirm their commitments to peace.
Libya was also instrumental in brokering peace agreements with the
Chadian
government and the United Forces for Change (FUC) rebel group, as well
as
agreements between the Central African government and two of its rebel
groups.
We're often asked about the roles that two key players, France and
China, play
in the region. France, as the former colonial power in both Chad and
CAR,
wields great influence and has military forces stationed in both
countries.
While French troops in Chad provide logistical support to the Chadian
government, they do not directly engage in fighting with rebel groups.
This is not the case in CAR, where French troops have directly engaged
rebels
in the northeast. It is said that much of France's engagement in Africa
is
based on President Chirac's personal relationships with several African
leaders, including President Deby. Given the current post-election
environment,
we cannot predict how France's relationship with Chad and CAR will
evolve. We
think that this uncertainty affects actions in both Bangui and
N'djamena.
We believe that China enjoys considerable leverage in Sudan,
particularly due
to its substantial economic investment, and we expect China to be part
of the
solution to the regional problems The Chinese have been largely
supportive of
our efforts to resolve the Darfur situation through peaceful means and
have
been publicly encouraging Khartoum to allow the AU/UN hybrid force as
agreed to
in Addis.
China's Ambassador to the UN Wang Guangya played a vital and
constructive role
in helping to broker the November 2006 Addis agreement that committed
Sudan to
a three-phase operation leading to a hybrid force under UN command.
During his recent visit to Khartoum, Chinese President Hu Jintao
encouraged
Sudanese President Bashir to show flexibility and allow the AU/UN hybrid
force
to be deployed. While we welcome and encourage China's efforts to apply
diplomatic pressure on the Government of Sudan, we look to Beijing to
join with
the international community in applying more forceful measures, should
Khartoum
remain intransigent.
China has long had a positive relationship with CAR and re-established
diplomatic relations with Chad. While investment in CAR is limited
compared to
its investment in Sudan, Chinese investment is trending upward. China's
relationship August 2006. While China's relationship with Chad is
nascent, and
it is too early to make predictions, we hope that China's economic
interests
and need for natural resources will cause China to take greater
initiative to
further regional peace.
Again, the Darfur conflict has important regional and international
dimensions
that must be addressed in the pursuit of peace. The United States
Government is
addressing these elements, as part of a comprehensive solution to the
conflicts
and humanitarian crises in Sudan and in neighboring countries.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Released on May 7, 2007
